Abubakar Samaila, Yusuf Abdullahi et Ahmadu Bello

Sokoto Jihad and the extension of flagship authority to the Zarma territories, 1817-1845

Résumé

Le djihad de Sokoto au XIXe siècle a déstabilisé le royaume de Kebbi et s'est étendu vers l'ouest pour englober Dosso, Sayi et Junju. Après l'établissement de Sokoto et de Gwandu comme centres du califat en 1809, le califat occidental sous Abdullahi s'est étendu jusqu'au pays yoruba, avec Ilorin comme émirat clé. D'autres régions sous l'influence du califat comprenaient Nupe, Gurma, Zabarma, Liptako et Macina. Le jihad mené par Usman Dan Fodio aboutit à la conquête des Zarma, qui se soumirent. La partie orientale du Zarmatarey était gouvernée par les Tamkalla Fulani et les Touaregs, tandis que la partie occidentale était sous l'influence d'Alfa MammanJobbo et de ses descendants. En 1817, Abdullahi Fodiyo lança une expédition à Dosso, capitale du royaume de Zaberma, et nomma Sarkin Zabarma Zarmakoi émir. Malgré la résistance des Zarma, Dosso est restée sous la juridiction du califat jusqu'en 1856. Cet article explore comment les changements d'allégeance entre les Zaberma de Dosso et les djihadistes de Sokoto ont conduit à la remise de drapeaux aux émirs rivaux de Dosso, Sayi et Junju. La remise de drapeaux aux différents émirs de la région a joué un rôle crucial dans l'expansion et la consolidation du djihad d'Usman Bn Fodio. Malgré la division coloniale entre le Nigeria et le Niger, les relations cordiales entre les différents groupes des régions de Zaberma et de Hausa ont persisté.

Abstract

The Sokoto Jihad of the 19^th century destabilized the Kingdom of Kebbi and expanded westward to incorporate Dosso, Sayi, and Junju. Following the establishment of Sokoto and Gwandu as caliphate centers in 1809, the western caliphate under Abdullahi stretched into Yorubaland, with Ilorin as a key emirate. Other regions under caliphate influence included Nupe, Gurma, Zabarma, Liptako, and Macina. The jihad led by Usman Dan Fodio resulted in the conquest of Zarma, leading to their submission. The eastern Zarmatarey was ruled by Tamkalla Fulani and Tuareg, while the western part came under the influence of Alfa MammanJobbo and his descendants. In 1817, Abdullahi Fodiyo launched an expedition to Dosso, capital of the Zaberma Kingdom, appointing Sarkin Zabarma Zarmakoi as emir. Despite Zarma resistance, Dosso remained under the caliphate's jurisdiction until 1856. This paper explores how shifting loyalties between the Zaberma of Dosso and the Sokoto jihadists led to the issuance of flags to competing emirs of Dosso, Sayi, and Junju. The issuance of flags to respective emirs in the region played a crucial role in expanding and consolidating the Jihad of Usman Bn Fodio. Despite the colonial division into Nigeria and Niger, cordial relations between various groups in the Zaberma and Hausa regions persisted.

Table des matières

pp. 236-256

Introduction

1The Sokoto Jihad, which culminated in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early nineteenth century, stands as one of the most transformative socio-political and intellectual movements in West African history. Far from being a spontaneous outburst of religious fervor, it represented the culmination of an intellectual and reformist quest that had been evolving for centuries across the wider Bilād al-Sūdān. Rooted in the rich scholarly traditions of Islamic learning that flourished from Timbuktu to Borno, the movement embodied both spiritual renewal and political reordering. Under the leadership of Sheikh Usman b. Fodiyo, the Jihad sought to restore moral rectitude, ensure just governance, and revive orthodox Islam within the Hausa states and beyond. By the nineteenth century, the Sokoto Caliphate had emerged as the largest and most organized polity in West Africa. Administratively, it was divided into two major centers: Sokoto, under the leadership of Muhammadu Bello, and Gwandu, under Abdullahi ibn Fodiyo. Gwandu, established as a distinct administrative hub in 1805, oversaw the western flank of the Caliphate and became the command center for the reformist and expansionist operations that extended its reach into the western Sudan.1 Sheikh Danfodiyo relocation to Gwandu around 1805 was a strategic move, intended to address logistical challenges such as military coordination, food scarcity, and access to water and pasturelands during the early consolidation phase of the movement.2

2Following the formal establishment of Sokoto and Gwandu as twin seats of authority in 1809, the Caliphate’s territorial influence expanded remarkably. Under Abdullahi’s stewardship, the western domain of the Caliphate extended deep into Yorubaland—with Ilorin emerging as a key emirate—while encompassing Nupe, Gurma, Zabarma, Liptako (in present-day Burkina Faso), and Macina (in the modern Republic of Mali).3 Simultaneously, Muhammadu Bello’s eastern command extended the Caliphate’s authority over major Hausa states including Kano, Katsina, Daura, Gobir, Zamfara, and Zazzau, as well as territories such as Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, and parts of Borno. This vast network of emirates created a complex and dynamic political system unified under the banner of religious reform and guided by the intellectual and moral authority of Sokoto.4

3Despite the Caliphate’s remarkable reach, modern historiography has tended to focus disproportionately on its core territories, Sokoto, Kano, and Gwandu, while neglecting its peripheral and frontier emirates.5 The relative abundance of documentary sources for the central Caliphate contrasts sharply with the paucity of studies on its external relations and the historical trajectories of its distant allies. Consequently, the intricate web of interactions between Sokoto and its frontier emirates, many of which lay outside the present borders of Nigeria, remains inadequately explored. Even comprehensive studies of the Caliphate often treat these external connections only in passing, overlooking their strategic and ideological importance in sustaining the Caliphate’s hegemony.6

4It is within this historiographical gap that the present paper finds its focus. The study seeks to reconstruct and analyze the historical relationship between the Sokoto Caliphate and its distant emirates, with particular emphasis on the Zaberma (Zarmaganda) region. By centering on Zaberma, the paper aims to highlight the dynamics of authority, legitimacy, and religious reform that defined its engagement with the broader jihadist movement and the subsequent consolidation of the Caliphate’s influence across the western Sudan. Zaberma occupies a crucial position in this narrative, not merely as a peripheral outpost, but as a significant frontier through which the Caliphate’s ideological and political vision was projected beyond the core territories of Hausaland.

5The paper contends that the historical trajectory of Zaberma, marked by its shifting degrees of autonomy, accommodation, and at times open resistance, reflects the enduring imprint of the jihad reformist agenda. Its foundational legitimacy within the larger jihadist movement was derived by the conferral of the flag (tuta), a powerful emblem of spiritual sanction by Sheikh Usman b. Fodiyo or his principal lieutenants, Abdullahi and Muhammadu Bello. The granting of these flags symbolized not only the Caliphate’s recognition of local authority but also the integration of Zaberma into the spiritual and administrative orbit of Sokoto, even amidst its tendencies toward local assertion.

6Using Zaberma as a focal point of analysis, the paper contributes to a broader understanding of the Caliphate’s western frontiers and the complex modalities through which Islamic reform, political control, and regional identity intersected. To situate this exploration within broader intellectual and historical frame, the subsequent section offers a brief overview of the Sokoto Jihad, its ideological foundations, structural organization, and the processes through which the Caliphate evolved into a vast religious and political order, spanning much of nineteenth-century West Africa.

The 1804 Jihad and the establishment of the Caliphate

7The Sokoto Jihad started after the disagreement which ensued between the Sheikh Usmanu Danfodiyo and the authorities in Gobir. Danfodiyo and his entire community emigrated from Degel and settled in Gudu on the northwestern border of Gobir. After the establishment of the community in Gudu on 21 February 1804, new disciples continued to flock to Shehu. Sarkin Gobir later wrote to Danfodiyo and told him that he was declaring war on the community.7 The community met, swore allegiance to Shehu and proclaimed him Sarkin Musulmi (Commander of the Believers), a title still held by the Sultan of Sokoto.8 Between 1804 and 1808, most of the Hausa states fall to the Jihadists and Alkalawa, the capital of Gobir, was also captured.9

8The first battle was between Shehu Danfodiyo's supporters and a small punitive expedition from Gobir. Yunfa's soldiers were defeated and Danfodiyo took advantage of this to occupy two northern towns, Matankari and Kwanni on the border of Adar. Sarkin Gobir Yunfa wrote, according to Bello, to the Hausa rulers to ask for their help. They promised him help but none of them came, as they were busy facing their own internal opposition. Only the Tuaregs accompanied Yunfa on his expedition against Gudu. Yunfa, accompanied by his Tuareg allies and some Fulani groups not yet rallied to Shehu, wanted to cut off the reformers from the road to prevent them from fleeing and wanted to attack them. But some villagers informed Shehu of Yunfa's position. The meeting took place at the Kwatto pond (Tabkin Kwatto) west of Gudu where the soldiers of Sarkin Gobir were defeated.10

9Various Sarakunan Zamfara, enemies of Gobir, then moved to Shehu. In July 1804 the community left Gudu and settled in Magabci, the Sokoto region. From there Shehu wrote to all the Hausa chiefs explaining the reasons and meaning of his struggle against the Sarkin Gobir. He asked them to help him to bring about justice and the true Muslim religion. Only Sarkin Zazzau responded favourably, but he was disowned by the ruling classes of his kingdom. The refusal of the Hausa rulers to participate in the Jihad gave a clearer ethnic coloration to the Shehu’s faction. Although there were many Hausas in all regions with him, including the Gobirawa and also the Zarma, Barebari and Tuareg, his most influential supporters were now Fulani, hence the name 'Fulani wars' was erroneously given to his struggle.11 The Gobir army reinforced by the Tuareg and the Sarkin Adar troops attacked Shehu’s people at Tsuntsua, a village near Alkalawa. The Jihadists were severely defeated loosing 2,000 men, including 200 literate men who knew the Koran by heart.12 In March 1805 the community moved much further south, to Sabon Gari, near Zamfara. In April, the Jihadists army led by its SarkinYaki (warlord) Ali Jedo captured the Kabi capital, BirninKabi, and by October the community had moved to Gwandu near this new conquest.13

10Shortly after his arrival in Gwandu, Shehu faced a major attack by the Gobirawa, assisted by the Tuareg KelGeres and Itesan, Sarkin Adar and a group of Kabawa. Two encounters took place in Alkalawa, not far from Gwandu. Shortly after Alwassa, Namoda, leader of the Fulani Alibawa, based in Zurmi, inflicted a severe defeat on a coalition of Tuareg, Adarawa and Zamfarawa.14 The battle of Zurmi forced Tuareg to made peace with Shehu. All the while, throughout the Hausa states and in neighbouring regions, Shehu's supporters had become organised and armed, and were fighting against the local rulers. At the beginning of 1807, the reformers, led by Umaru Dallaji, captured the whole of Katsina, thus completing the encirclement of Gobir. Subsequently, Kano was conquered at the end of the second year, as was Zaria. Furthermore, on 3 October 1808, the Jihadists stormed Alkalawa and Sultan Yunfa lost his life.15 With the fall of Alkalawa, resistance to the Jihadists was broken everywhere. The Gobirawa asked for peace which lasted until the death of Usman dan Fodio.

11After the last and main pocket of resistance was swept away, Shehu set about organising the Empire which covered practically the whole of the Hausa countries. It also included Western Bornu, whose capital Ngazargamu had been taken on 12 March 1808 by GwaniMuktar, Adamawa, Bauci, later Nupe and the Yoruba country of Ilorin.16 This organisation remained rather rudimentary as Shehu was more concerned with religious matters and Abdullahi, Bello and Ali Jedo were simply assigned responsibility for the administration of the state. As said earlier, Bello was given responsibility for the East, Abdullahi for the West and Ali Jedo for the North. Part of their function is to oversee the installations of the provincial emirs, received tribute from them, and endeavoured to ensure that their governments and systems of taxation followed the principles of Muslim law and were not arbitrary and extortionate. It is to this designation of functions in the appointment of flag bearers that we now turn our attention.

The Jihad and appointment of Flag bearers

12The Sheikh right from the inception of the Jihad, appointed a number of commanders to lead expeditions to different directions. Every expedition carried a flag. The Shiekh’s own flag bearer was one of his servants called Ibrahim and the office of the flag bearer of the Caliph remained in his family.17 By extension, when Muslim leaders came to the Sheikh from other parts of Hausaland, they were sent home to lead a local campaign with a flag blessed by the Sheikh.18 They were thus, given the title of Amir al-Jaish like any other leader of an expedition sent out by the Sheikh. In this way many areas who had already established emirate system of administration before the jihad became eager to pay allegiance to the Sheikh. Therefore, as the Sheikh divided the responsibilities in Sokoto, the provincial commanders were given spheres of influence in definite territories. Once established in their regions, they were (lieutenants) Amirs, with the Viziers, Abdullahi and Bello only acting as their intermediaries to the Sheikh.19

13The caliphate has therefore established a sort of representative emirate system of government where by the central government acted only as a coordinating center. The Caliphate used the concept of amil‘representative’ in conducting day-to-day administrative functions.20 The flag bearers who led execution of the Jihad consequently turned out to be the leaders of their respective domains. For instance, after the conquest of Bauchi, Yakubu ruled his emirate with justice and wisdom for forty years, and according to Johnston, he had never wavered in his loyalty to Sokoto.21 The same applies to all other flag bearers who included Abu Hamid of Zamfara; Umar Dallaji of Katsina; Sulaiman of Kano; Ishaq of Daura; Ibrahim of Bornu; Muhammad Manga of the eastern Bornu; BubaYero of Gombe; Moyijo of Kebbi; Musa of Zazzau; Ibrahim Zaki of Katagum; Muhammad Wabi of Jam’are; ModibboAdama of Adamawa; and Muhammad al-hajj al-amin of Baghirmi.22

14In the western flank of the Caliphate, the Jihad destabilized the Kingdom of Kebbi, and went further west to incorporate the areas of the Zabermawa of Dosso as well as the emirates of Sayi, Junju and Liptako. The Zarmatarey or Zarma country is the area of expansion of the Zarma from the Zarmaganda,23 which was at the same time the place of origin of the Zarma. The area is a vast tertiary plateau sloping slightly to the south and intersected from north to south with fossil tributaries of the Niger river along the Dallols Mawri, Fogha and Bosso. The climate of the area is Sahelian, but in the southern tip it has a North Sudanese character.24At the beginning of the 19th century, the insidious infiltration of the Tuareg broke the fragile balance of the Zarmatareysubgroups because the newcomers had no understanding of compromise and the game of matrimonial alliances.25 The Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio led to the conquest of Zarma and consequently it led to their subsequent submission to the Jihadist. The eastern part of Zarmatarey was ruled by the Tamkalla Fulani and the Tuareg, while the western part was spiritually subjugated by the persistent piety and diplomacy of Alfa MammanJobbo and his descendants.26 In 1817, Abdullahi Fodiyo led an expedition to Dosso, the capital of the Zaberma Kingdom.27 It was consequent upon his success that he appointed Sarkin Zabarma Zarmakoi as the Emir of Zabarma in Dosso.28 In the 1820s Dosso people mounted some resistance to the Jihadist but finally they were subjected under the administration of the Sokoto Caliphate under Sultan Muhammad Bello as we shall see in the next section.

15At the time of the Shehu’s tour in Dendi he came across prominent personalities who helped him execute the Jihad. Hodi sent some prominent personalities to Shehu from Dandi which strengthened their connection with the jihadists. Burta has emerged as the Fulani leader in Dendi and he sent envoys to Shehu who has already started armed conflict with Gobir, to pledge his support. The ruler of Koma, Abubakar Alfa, left his town for Degel where he received investiture (flag) from Usman dan Fodio.29 But both leaders were not fully equipped for the prosecution of the Jihad against elements who has no respect for Islam. Burta left for Gwandu after the latter had been established as an operational base against Kabi. Abubakar was rejected by his own people and was forced to retire to Sanihina where he fought many jihad wars. There was confused fighting in Dandi, but by 1811 hegemony of the jihadists had been established in several towns there.30 The control of the region was shared between the emirate of Gwandu and Tamkala. But upper Dandi remained turbulent and both Bello and Muhammad had to lead expeditions against it. The complete submission of the territory was obtained after 1831 and Burta was established at Zogirma as Emir of Dandi. Surbodinate hakimai were appointed at Kawara-Debe, Kawara-Kaina, and Bara. The complications arising out of the jihadists' contacts with the people of Dandi centered on the latter's definite for the Jihad, the peoples of hostility to Islam. Even before Dandi exhibited a greeter attachment to Tsafi then the Kabawa. The appointment of Fulani hakimai was therefore resented. Yellu objected to the elevation of Junju to a position of authority over it. The subject population of Dandi felt resentful about the payment of tribute, which was collected with some degree of severity, and incidence of forced labour. It was on the latter grievance that Yellu revolted in c.1848/9.31

Zabarma area before the Jihad of 1804

16Before examining the Sokoto Caliphate’s extension of flagship authority to Zabarma, it is pertinent to first provide a historio-geographical overview of the area. Such contextualization allows for a clearer understanding of the region’s population dynamics and socio-cultural landscape prior to the Sokoto Jihad. As earlier noted, Dosso is a region situated entirely within present-day Niger Republic and parts of Mali, extending westward from Hausaland. The term “Dosso” itself originally meant “west of Hausaland.” According to Flugestad, the Dossowa are inhabitants of westernmost Niger and adjoining areas of Burkina Faso and Nigeria, with smaller settlements found in northern Ghana. Their language belongs to the Songhai branch of the Nilo-Saharan language family. Ethnographically, they are considered a subgroup of the broader Songhai people and are sometimes referred to as the “Zerma Songhai.”32

17The Zaberma (or Zarma) Kingdom occupied the westernmost fringes of the Hausa-Fulani cultural zone, extending across present-day southwestern Niger and parts of northern Benin. Before the Sokoto Jihad (1804–1810), Zaberma society was already exposed to gradual Islamization through itinerant scholars and traders from Katsina, Kebbi, and Bornu, as well as from the Songhai centers of Gao and Timbuktu.33 When the Sokoto Caliphate consolidated under Sultan Muhammad Bello (1817–1837), attention turned westward to expand both political and spiritual influence. This expansion aimed not only at territorial control but also at reforming what the jihadists viewed as syncretic or “corrupted” forms of Islam among frontier peoples.34 The Zaberma Kingdom, controlling significant trade routes along the Niger River, became a strategic focus of this effort. Maikassuwa provides a more contemporary geographical delineation of Zabarma, describing it as encompassing the extreme southeastern part of Mali and the western region of the Niger Republic.35 The area is predominantly inhabited by Songhai and Zarma communities, with some Fulani settlements found along the western bank of the River Niger.36

18Historically, the Songhai were the first to be identified as Dossowa. Over time, however, the group split into two: the original Songhai group and the newly emergent Zarma group.37 By the eighteenth century, many Zarma communities migrated southwards towards the Niger River valley, the Fatake Plateau, and Zigui—regions that today correspond to southwestern Niger and the vicinity of Niamey.38Historical sources indicate that the Songhai presence in this area occurred in three distinct waves of settlement. The earliest wave dates back to the military campaigns of Askia Muhammad between 1505 and 1517.39 The second wave followed the collapse of the Songhai Empire after its defeat by Moroccan forces at the Battle of Tondibi in 1591.40 Following the conquest, remnants of the Gao population, under Askia NouhouIssihak, established themselves in Dendi and waged a prolonged guerrilla resistance with the support of the Kabi Kingdom until around 1599.41 However, their political cohesion gradually disintegrated by 1640 as a result of internal conflicts. The foundations of the contemporary Songhai chiefdom trace back to the third wave of migration. This later movement consisted of small Songhai groups who likely departed from the Dendi region—situated between Ansongo and Niamey—at the dawn of the eighteenth century, establishing new settlements and political structures that would shape the subsequent sociopolitical evolution of the area. With the constant pressure from the Tuaregs and Fulani as well as other ethnic groups in the area, one of the Zarma community leader named Djermakoy Abubakar founded the Dosso state from his own Taguru clan around 1750.42Dosso had remained a small collection of villages until the 1820s when it led much of the resistance to the Sokoto caliphate. The state of Dosso fell under the Sokoto caliphate in the second half of the 19^th century although they were able to retain their Djermakoy as the nominal rulers of a much larger Djerma territory.

19Thus, from the above we can understand that before 1817, the Zarma were organized into small, decentralized political communities rather than a unified kingdom. Authority rested in local chiefs (zarmakoy) and lineage heads (jirwaya), who exercised control over land, trade, and social order.43 Political legitimacy was grounded in ancestral traditions and spiritual practices rather than a centralized bureaucracy.Islam existed but remained localized and blended with indigenous practices—spirit possession, ancestor veneration, and traditional divination coexisted with Islamic prayers and festivals.44 Such hybrid religiosity was precisely what the Sokoto reformers sought to purify, using Islamic jurisprudence (sharia) as both a moral and political instrument.45.This decentralized system made the Zaberma both resistant to and susceptible to jihadist expansion: resistant because each village valued its autonomy, but susceptible because alliances could be easily negotiated or coerced at the local level.46

20The greatest Fulani concentration in Zabarma was contained in the Dollal-Boboye (or Dollol-Bosso). The political set-up centered on the existence of three independent petty Zabarma states Dosso, Koita, and Ndounga. By the beginning of the Jihad, Dosso was emerging to a position of leadership amongst these states, and this had the effect of arousing their jealousy.47 When the wars of the Jihad began the leader of the Fulani of Dollol-Boboye, Abubakar Luluje, travelled to Usman dan Fodio and was appointed Lamido zarma with authority up to the Tillibery region. When the Caliphate was divided into two for more effective administrative supervision Abubakar was put under Gwandu. The Zabarma of Ndounga and Koita (the Zabarma of the west) recognized his authority, while Dosso (the Zabarma of the east) remained hostile. Dosso felt resentful because the Jihad, by bringing new elements to power, had annulled its efforts to achieve the political unification of Zabarma.48 Dosso's hostility was aggravated by Abubakar's own lack of administrativ prudence. According to M.B. Alkali:

21Supported by both Sokoto and Gwandu the Zabarma of Dosso led by Hamman Bugaran an Sorkoize (a pretender to the Koita throne) spear headed a rebellion to oust him. The rebellion succeeded and Abubakar was forced to flee to Gwandu. But his successors did not change the policy of repression. Th Emir of Gwandu, Muhammad, induced Sambo, the ruler of Tamkala to make peace with Dosso. Sambo convened a meeting with Dosso notables at Fondu where he murdered them. Attempts by Dosso to enlist the support of the Caliph Bello did not receive attention. The Caliph's army traversed Kabi, with whom pea had been obtained, to defeat the Zabarma of Dosso and establish the authority of Tamkala over the enti Zabarma. But to his defeat was by no means completely decisive for soon after the forces of the Caliph had withdrawn, Daudu Bugaran (i.e. Daudu Boryo) began insurgence. The ruler of Tamkala, Abd al-Hasan, led an expedition against Dosso and Daudu Bugaran was defeated and driven out of the town c.1848/9. The defeat of Daudu marked a significant turning point in the history of the Zabarma. Daudu left Dosso as a displaced person with a considerable number of cavalry. He had been abandoned by other Dosso notables when his cause had proved hopeless in the face of a tenacious foe at Tamkala. With Daudu's exit Abd al-Hasan was triumphant in Tamkala. Dosso was required to pay a large amount of tribute. Abd al-Hasan organized systematic raids on eastern Zabarma towns for the purpose of enslaving free-born people and confiscating their property. The people of Dosso resented this very strongly particularly when the Zabarma of the west were not subject to the same policy. This differential treatment might be justifiable in the context of the Islamic legal system but the Zabarma of Dosso could hardly appreciate this. During the seven years in which Abd al-Hasan was supreme in Zabarma, Dosso was greatly repressed and many notables left to join Daudu at Giwaye and later pper Dollol-Fogha.49

The Extension of Flagship authority to Zaberma area: Dosso, Sayi and Junju Emirates

22The extension of Caliphate influence westward relied heavily on frontier agents and intermediaries. The Tamkalla Fulani, who had long settled between Kebbi, Dosso, and Gaya, served as vital cultural brokers between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Zarma societies.50 Their dual identity—Fulani by origin but integrated into Zarma society—made them effective mediators of Sokoto’s reformist mission. The Tuareg groups of Aïr and Iwellemmeden also influenced the dynamics of expansion. Although sometimes opposed to Sokoto’s authority, they controlled major trans-Saharan trade routes, which jihadist envoys needed for safe passage.51 The Tuareg alternated between resistance and collaboration, depending on trade interests and local power balances.

23Among Sokoto’s emissaries, Alfa Mamman Jobbo stands out as a key figure. A scholar and warrior associated with Gwandu, Mamman Jobbo was tasked by Sultan Muhammad Bello with carrying the flag of authority (tuta or alama) to the western frontier.52 His mission involved not only military enforcement but also the establishment of Qur’anic schools, mosques, and judicial structures under Islamic law. Through his efforts, Dosso emerged as a nucleus of Islamic governance in the region.

24The 1817 expedition to Dosso was one of the earliest organized attempts by Sokoto to institutionalize Islamic rule in the western Sahel. Acting on Sultan Bello’s directives, Mamman Jobbo and allied Fulani contingents launched an expedition to bring Dosso under Sokoto’s protection and religious supervision.53 At the time, Dosso was a modest Zarma settlement without centralized authority. The expedition subdued several resistant communities and established a new emirate structure under a locally chosen ruler who accepted the Caliphate’s authority.54 The granting of the flag of Islam formally linked Dosso to Sokoto and Gwandu, thereby integrating it into the broader network of Caliphate emirates (Hiskett 122).In the aftermath, Islamic institutions flourished: new mosques were erected, Islamic courts replaced traditional tribunals, and scholars from Hausaland settled to teach Qur’anic law (Fisher 91). Yet the process remained uneven—while Dosso and Sayi aligned with Sokoto, Junju and neighboring territories continued to resist, maintaining syncretic religious systems and periodic rebellions.

25It should however be made clear here, that, not all Zaberma leaders welcomed the new jihadist authority. Some perceived Sokoto’s expansion as a threat to their cultural autonomy and ancestral traditions. Local rulers in Junju, Sorko, and other districts mobilized opposition, often in alliance with Tuareg warriors and disaffected Zarma chiefs. 55These resistances led to periodic skirmishes between Sokoto envoys and local militias well into the 1830s.Others adopted strategies of accommodation. Chiefs who converted to Islam or pledged allegiance to Sokoto were allowed to maintain semi-autonomous status, provided they collected taxes (zakat) and upheld basic Islamic norms.56 This flexibility in governance helped Sokoto consolidate authority without direct colonial-style control.By the 1840s, emirates such as Dosso, Sayi, and Junju had evolved into hybrid political entities—Islamic in structure but Zarma in social character. These emirates became centers of learning and trade, connecting Sokoto’s western frontier to the Sahelian economy.57

26As discussed in the last section, the Sokoto Jihad of the 19^th Century destabilized the Kingdom of Kebbi, and went further west to incorporate the areas of Dosso, Sayi and Junju. Furthermore, at the beginning of the same century there was the insidious infiltration of the Tuareg which broke the fragile balance of the Zarmatarey subgroups because the newcomers had no understanding of compromise and the game of matrimonial alliances.58 The eastern part of Zarmatarey was ruled by the Tamkalla Fulani and the Tuareg, while the western part was spiritually subjugated by the persistent piety and diplomacy of Alfa Mamman Jobbo and his descendants.59 In 1817, Abdullahi Fodiyo led an expedition to Dosso, the capital of the Zaberma Kingdom.60 It was consequent upon his success that he appointed sarkinZabarmaZarmakoi as the Emir of Zabarma in Dosso.61 In the 1820s Dosso people mounted some resistance to the Jihadist but finally they were subjected under the administration of the Sokoto Caliphate. However, resistance continued down to 1830s and 1840s especially when Issa Korombé, sought Kebbi alliance against the Caliphate. Korombe joined forces with Dauda Bagaran and Hamma Fandu in Kabi, around 1849, coinciding with the time of the revolt of Yakuba Nabame, who proclaimed himself SarkinKabi and set up his capital at Argungu.62 With the support of Kabi and Tsibiri the Zarma was able to victoriously repelled a Fulani attack at Gorubankassam north-east of Dosso.63 In spite of the series of Zarma resistance, Dosso remained under the Caliphate as part of the Jurisdiction of Gwandu up to 1856.64 During the time of Emir Ibrahim Halilu bn Abdullahi, the Zabarma also rebelled against Gwandu, the rebels however were defeated at Dubadama with the combined forces of Sokoto sent by SarkinMusulmiAliyu Babba, led by his brother Yusuf as well as Umar Nagwamatse to assist the Emir of Gwandu65

27Further west of Dosso Emirate are also the Emirates of Sayi and Junju. The emirates of Sayi and Junju (in the present day Niger Republic) came under the influence of the western axis of the sokoto caliphate with Headquarters in Gwandu. Sultan Muhammadu Bello reinforced the forces of the Emir of Gwandu with Sullubawa armies under the leadership and command of Baraden Wamakko.66 The emirate of Sayi was the seat of learned Muslim scholar known as Modibbo who supplied Gwandu with the needed forces and resources with which it conducted the islamization of the westernmost regions of its territories.67 Some sources reported that Modibbo or rather Diobbo, and his companion Boubakar Lokouji/Luluje, are two famous clerics who established their hegemony in Sayi at about 1810.68 Because of his reputation as learned and peaceful man, Diobbo soon gained an ascendency over the Fulani in the Sayi region who recognized him as their overlord. Sayi, therefore, became not only a seat of learning, but also an important economic center through which east-west trade, especially trade along the river was channeled.69 By the time Diobbo died in 1840, he was by far the single most important chief of the west and could claim allegiance from a host of lesser chiefs of the right bank of the river valley.70Diobbo in turn considered himself to be a vassal of the Sarkin Musulmi in Sokoto.71

28In the same manner, BoubakarLokouji/Luluje, Diobbo companion and the leader of the Fulani who settled down in the middle of Dallol Bosso also established close ties with Sokoto caliphate, especially with the Emir of Gwandu. By this arrangement, the Zerma, the Mauri, the Dendi and also the Kebbawa, were caught in the middle and by about 1830-1835, the first three were reduced to a state of vassaldom compelled to pay tributes.72Similarly, in Junju Emirate, it was the Alfa Adde who served as representative of Mallam Abdullahi bn Fodio and consequently assumed the role of an Emir.73 Just like other emirates in the western part of the caliphate, Emirate of Junju participated and gave assistance to Gwandu in their campaign in the expansion and protection of the caliphate.

Conclusion and further reflections

29The expansion of the Sokoto Caliphate into the Zaberma territories between 1817 and 1845 represents one of the most significant yet underexplored dimensions of the nineteenth-century jihadist movements in West Africa. The episode demonstrates how the ideological, religious, and political architecture of the Caliphate transcended ethnic, linguistic, and territorial boundaries to produce an interconnected Islamic order stretching from Hausaland to the western Sudan. The Zaberma or Zarmaganda region—comprising Dosso, Sayi, and Junju—thus emerges not merely as a frontier of conquest but as an essential laboratory for examining the Caliphate’s adaptive strategies of expansion, negotiation, and religious reform.At its core, the Sokoto Jihad was both a theological and sociopolitical project. It was an attempt to establish a just Islamic polity grounded in sharia, knowledge, and moral governance. Yet, its endurance and success depended on its pragmatic incorporation of diverse communities through symbols of allegiance such as the flag (tuta or alama). The granting of these flags to rulers in Dosso, Sayi, and Junju by Sheikh Usman b. Fodiyo and his lieutenants Abdullahi and Muhammadu Bello constituted more than a ceremonial act, as it was a political theology in practice, embedding divine legitimacy within local authority structures. Through this symbolic mechanism, Sokoto and Gwandu extended their influence far beyond their immediate frontiers, transforming local leadership into integral components of a trans-regional Islamic confederation.

30Nevertheless, the Zaberma frontier was never fully pacified or homogenized. Periodic revolts, shifting alliances, and inter-ethnic conflicts, particularly the resistances led by Issa Korombé and allied Zarma-Tuareg coalitions, revealed the enduring vitality of local political cultures. Yet, these disruptions did not negate the Caliphate’s influence; instead, they underscored the resilience of its integrative mechanisms. By combining military power, spiritual charisma, and administrative flexibility, the Caliphate managed to sustain authority over a mosaic of communities whose allegiance fluctuated with time and circumstance. From a broader historiographical perspective, the extension of flagship authority to Zaberma underscores the need to reinterpret the Sokoto Caliphate not as a monolithic theocracy confined to northern Nigeria but as a dynamic and polycentric network of Islamic governance that interacted fluidly with preexisting polities across the Sahel. The Zaberma emirates of Dosso, Sayi, and Junju exemplify how the Caliphate’s ideological currents redefined the political geography of the western Sudan. By embedding the jihad’s intellectual and spiritual ideals within local contexts, Sokoto effectively transformed peripheral societies into participants in a shared Islamic civilizational project.

31Furthermore, the endurance of these connections beyond the mid-nineteenth century, despite colonial partitions and shifting boundaries, testifies to the depth of social and religious integration achieved under Caliphate hegemony. The persistence of cordial relations between Zarma and Hausa communities across what later became the Nigeria–Niger border reflects the lasting legacies of jihad-era diplomacy, religious scholarship, and trade. These trans-border affinities continue to inform patterns of kinship, mobility, and Islamic learning in contemporary West Africa.In sum, the extension of flagship authority to the Zaberma territories was both a religious mission and a political innovation. It revealed the Sokoto Caliphate’s capacity for adaptive governance, its reliance on local intermediaries, and its profound understanding of the relationship between spiritual legitimacy and political order. Ultimately, the case of Zaberma challenges conventional narratives of the Sokoto Jihad as a purely Hausa-Fulani phenomenon. Instead, it invites a rethinking of the Caliphate as a plural and cosmopolitan enterprise whose intellectual, diplomatic, and religious networks bridged linguistic, ethnic, and ecological frontiers. The legacies of this historical encounter, visible in the enduring cultural, religious, and political ties between northern Nigeria and southwestern Niger, remain vital to understanding the longue durée of West African statecraft, Islamic reform, and inter-societal relations.

Notes

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Quelques mots à propos de :  Abubakar Samaila

Quelques mots à propos de :  Yusuf Abdullahi

Quelques mots à propos de :  Ahmadu Bello